Abstract-Security in mobile ad hoc networks is difficult to achieve because of vulnerability of the links, inadequate physical protection, the dynamically changing topology and the sporadic nature of the connectivity. The dynamic change in topology results in the change of trust relationships among the nodes and as a result any security solution with a static configuration will not suffice. Authentication protocols and key management play a vital role and are the basis of security in many distributed systems. In this paper, a novel Randomly Shifted Certification Authority authentication protocol (RASCAAL) for ad hoc networks is presented. RASCAAL employs a trusted third party for authentication purposes which holds the public key certificates and acts as a certification authority (CA). RASCAAL has been developed to take into account the radio technology communication related characteristics of the underlying IEEE 802.11 MAC for ad hoc networks. This is achieved by integration with the CSMA/CA medium access rules to enable nodes to securely exchange messages for different transactions. To the best of author's knowledge, RASCAAL is the first authentication protocol which proposes the concept of dynamically formed short lived random clusters with no prior knowledge of the cluster head. To achieve this, RASCAAL implements the idea of a random ACTIVE CA selection and CA role shift in the network. This property significantly enhances the overall security of the communicating nodes. The protocol design is formally verified using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic.
I. INTRODUCTION
An authentication protocol involves a sequence of message exchanges which verify the identities of nodes in a distributed system wishing to communicate [1, 2] . Authentication, which can be realized by using either public or private key cryptography, is of particular importance as it provides the first line of defense against attacks and forms the basis for achieving the other security goals of integrity and confidentiality. Public key cryptography (PKC) has been widely accepted as an effective mechanism for providing fundamental security services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation [3] . It involves a trusted third party which holds public key certificates acting as a certification authority (CA). Much research has been conducted into authentication techniques for ad hoc networks which distribute the CA functionality [4, 5] to a set of nodes in the network (called Threshold Cryptography). This method has several disadvantages such as the compromise of the entire network if the collector node is compromised, the lack of network growing rules and the adverse effect on the ad hoc network life span due to partial certificate collection and complete certificate generation times. Nodes themselves can act as CAs to collect and issue public key certificates on demand to 1 and 2 hop neighbours [6] using broadcast messages to establish a chain of trust across the network. Security in ad hoc networks can also be achieved by clustering of the network with one pre-defined node in each cluster acting as a cluster head, which executes all administrative functions of the cluster and holds a share of the network secret (key), used for certification [7] . Soft decision processes have also been used in wireless sensor networks to achieve security by intrusion detection [8] . Unlike authentication, this is a second line of defense and is carried out by observing several attacks such as collision, unfairness and exhaustion.
Many of the security solutions that have been proposed for ad hoc networks, such as [4, 7, 9, 10] , fail to consider the underlying Medium Access Control (MAC) characteristics; the nodes in an ad hoc network must strictly obey the rules of the MAC to transmit the security related messages while still maintaining the necessary quality of service (QoS). In this paper, the constraints of mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANETs) in addition to the radio technology MAC layer related characteristics are taken into account in the development of a Novel randomly shifted CA authentication protocol -RASCAAL. RASCAAL forms dynamic short lived clusters with no prior knowledge of the cluster head by a random shift in the role of ACTIVE CA to any other ILDE CA in the network at the end of a transaction. This differs from the Threshold cryptography approach and the concept of permanent clusters with pre-defined cluster heads [7] . Knowledge of pre-defined cluster heads makes the network more vulnerable to attack. The intrusion detection solution proposed by Ren and Liang [8] does consider the underlying MAC characteristics, however whereas the focus of their work is to observe attacks, the RASCAAL protocol is a first line of defense and aims to prevent attacks through authentication.
RASCAAL is based on the proven concept of PKC, and secure and successful authentication also helps to achieve confidentiality and integrity. RASCAAL provides node authentication by using ACTIVE CAs, which provide an assurance of a node's public key certificate to any other node in the network The salient feature of RASCAAL's security is the very short life span of a randomly formed dynamic cluster, which is equivalent to the duration of the current transaction. This short existence and randomness in cluster formation with no prior knowledge of cluster head makes the system robust and difficult to attack. RASCAAL is described in detail in the next section. In section III, the proposed protocol is verified and analysed using BAN logic [11] . Finally conclusions and future wok are outlined in section IV.
II. RANDOMLY SHIFTED CA AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (RASCAAL)
RASCAAL has been specifically designed for heterogeneous ad hoc networks in which some of the nodes have additional hardware/software resources over other nodes. The resource enriched nodes can act as CA nodes and the density of non CA (resource constrained) nodes in the network will determine the number of CA nodes required to provide security services. This results in a linear relationship between network security and a threshold number of CA nodes. If a CA node wishes to become an ACTIVE CA, the underlying IEEE 802.11 [12] MAC provides it with prioritized access to the medium to transmit an ACTIVE_CA_MESSAGE management frame. To take control of the medium, an ACTIVE CA waits for a Point Coordination Function interframe Space (PIFS), as compared to other non CA nodes which wait for a Distributed Coordination Function interframe Space (DIFS), where PIFS < DIFS. The ACTIVE CA node engages in servicing public key certificate requests from other IDLE CAs (a CA node which has not become an ACTIVE CA yet) and non CA nodes in the network. In all the following sections, RASCAAL messages have been designed to obey the underlying IEEE 802.11 frames and MAC requirements.
A: RASCAAL (Initialization)
As part of initialization, which provides key management for the protocol, offline storage of all the participating node public keys can be performed. The ACTIVE CA node can transfer the image of the stored public keys to other IDLE CA nodes upon request. Alternatively, the number of public keys to be stored can be divided, and keys up to a certain number (depending upon the density of non CA nodes), can be stored per CA. On demand transfer of public keys can take place between both the ACTIVE CA and all other IDLE CA nodes employing multi hop operation in the network. Additionally, dynamic key management can take place where nodes can listen for an ACTIVE_CA_MESSAGE (Eqn. 1) and upload their public keys in a SEND_PUBLIC_KEY (Eqn. 2.1) frame. 
B: RASCAAL (Public key Request / Reply)
At the end of initialization, any non CA node who wishes to communicate with another node requests the destination node's public key from the current ACTIVE CA in a PUBLIC_KEY_REQUEST (Eqn. 2.2) frame. The protocol assumes that at least one of the non CA nodes is in the range of a current ACTIVE CA node to initiate a secure communication with another non CA node. The ACTIVE CA will either have the required public key certificate itself or can request it from other IDLE CA nodes and will complete the transaction by transmission of a PUBLIC_KEY_REPLY (Eqn. 3.1) frame as illustrated in Fig. 1 . At the end of a successful transaction, the current ACTIVE CA randomly selects the ID of any other available IDLE CA and shifts the CA ownership by a TRANSFER_CA_OWNERSHIP (Eqn. 4) message. If there is inactivity in the channel, with no communication between the nodes and any current ACTIVE CA for a time period of, TRANSFER_CA_OWNERSHIP frame + 2 * max IEEE 802.11 MAC frame time, the ACTIVE CA ownership will still be shifted for increased security. The new ACTIVE CA to which the ownership has just been transferred announces its CA ownership by an ACTIVE_CA_MESSAGE (Eqn. 1) management frame as shown in Fig. 2 . This results in the formation of a temporary cluster with a randomly selected cluster head for duration equal to the current transaction. The broadcast nature of the message and additionally, the presence of both the old ACTIVE CA ID and the newly selected ACTIVE CA ID help to identify any malicious ACTIVE CAs.
The ownership transfer message is re-broadcast by the intermediate IDLE CA nodes with an increment in the BCAST_COUNT value. The BCAST_COUNT value is reset by the destined node or once it reaches its maximum value, which is equal to the number of available CA nodes in the network. IDLE CA nodes always concatenate their own IDs before doing any re-broadcasting for increased security and neighbourhood monitoring. Both ACTIVE and IDLE CA nodes have an information base of already associated nodes and nodes that may potentially join the network. Thus, if any fake or duplicate non CA node ID is found, the ACTIVE CA node can access the medium with priority to revoke that particular node ID in a NODE_ID_REVOKE (Eqn. 5.1) message. Similarly any old ACTIVE CA who has just shifted the CA ownership or other IDLE CA nodes can detect and announce a fake CA ID using a CA_ID_REVOKE (Eqn. 5.2) broadcast message as depicted in Fig. 3 . A complete RASCAAL flowchart showing CA and other non CA node operations is shown in Fig. 4 . 
III. RASCAAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS USING BAN LOGIC
Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) [11] is formal logic that can be used to formally describe authentication protocols and by following definitions and postulates it can be used to analyse and verify authentication protocols.
A. RASCAAL description
The message exchanges among principals (nodes) in RASCAAL can be written in idealized form using BAN logic notations as described below. All the messages exchanged include the time stamp value T s , which is used to prove the freshness of the messages where all the nodes have their clocks synchronised to the ACTIVE CA clock. 
K CAi is the current ACTIVE CA public key. 
The ACTIVE CA sends N j+1 's public key, K Nj+1 , to the supplicant N j .
Message 3.2: Secure communication among nodes:
Message X is sent by node N j to node N j+1 and node N j supplies its own public key for two way communication. 
B. RASCAAL Analysis
To analyse the RASCAAL protocol, firstly assumptions are made as described in Table 1 . Subsequently the protocol is verified using BAN logic message meaning and jurisdiction postulates. 
Assumptions:
(i) -(iv): The non CA and CA nodes believe in their own public keys and also in each others public keys.
(v) -(vi): The non CA nodes also believe that the CAs have jurisdiction over all non CA node public keys and every CA node believes in other CA node public keys.
(vii) -(x): Finally, belief about the freshness of the time stamp value assures that the messages exchanged have not been replayed.
CA i , it can decrypt the message using K Thus, RASCAAL successfully authenticates nodes and achieves secure communication between them by assuring the ownership of public key certificates. Additionally, the protocol can successfully identify and revoke any malicious or rogue nodes.
IV. CONCLUSION
A novel authentication protocol for ad hoc networks, RASCAAL, has been presented. To the best of the author's knowledge, RASCAAL is the first authentication protocol that proposes the concept of dynamically formed short lived random clusters with no prior knowledge of cluster head, and to achieve this, RASCAAL implements the idea of a random ACTIVE CA selection and CA role shift in the network by integration with the underlying IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA MAC for ad hoc networks. The protocol has been described and analysed using BAN logic and it provides all of the important security requirements, namely authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. Nodes in RASCAAL achieve authentication by using public key certificates issued by a CA which assures the certificate's ownership. Confidentiality is obtained by encryption using public and private keys, and hash values have been employed where needed to provide integrity. Finally, time stamp values provide non-repudiation since all the node timers and timing values are synchronized with the CA clock. Future work is in progress, which involves implementation of the RASCAAL protocol using OPNET, to evaluate its security behaviour and to study the effect on the underlying CSMA/CA performance while maintaining the QoS requirements for actual traffic.
